1 00:00:02,640 --> 00:00:17,029 [Music] 2 00:00:22,070 --> 00:00:19,269 and hello from philadelphia frank here 3 00:00:22,630 --> 00:00:22,080 with yet another episode of ufo news 4 00:00:26,070 --> 00:00:22,640 network 5 00:00:27,029 --> 00:00:26,080 sunday a special uh a special friday 6 00:00:29,429 --> 00:00:27,039 evening effort 7 00:00:31,830 --> 00:00:29,439 uh going into early saturday because the 8 00:00:34,229 --> 00:00:31,840 ufo report dropped today 9 00:00:35,030 --> 00:00:34,239 before i get into all that a couple of 10 00:00:37,910 --> 00:00:35,040 things 11 00:00:38,229 --> 00:00:37,920 are a slow news week for the most part 12 00:00:40,869 --> 00:00:38,239 but 13 00:00:41,510 --> 00:00:40,879 a couple key things did happen uh the 14 00:00:44,549 --> 00:00:41,520 first 15 00:00:48,389 --> 00:00:44,559 was a another ambush interview from 16 00:00:50,069 --> 00:00:48,399 tmz where uh marco rubio commented on 17 00:00:52,790 --> 00:00:50,079 the forthcoming report 18 00:00:54,229 --> 00:00:52,800 and uh let's let's get the to rubio's 19 00:00:55,990 --> 00:00:54,239 comments i'll get through this uh 20 00:00:57,189 --> 00:00:56,000 preliminary stuff pretty quickly and 21 00:00:59,590 --> 00:00:57,199 we'll get to the 22 00:01:01,590 --> 00:00:59,600 uh the meat of the report such as it is 23 00:01:03,910 --> 00:01:01,600 but let's uh let's get to this uh 24 00:01:06,469 --> 00:01:03,920 the comments from marco rubio uh let's 25 00:01:09,030 --> 00:01:06,479 get to that right away let's go 26 00:01:10,870 --> 00:01:09,040 well judging from the report that came 27 00:01:11,670 --> 00:01:10,880 out uh yeah let's uh let's hope that it 28 00:01:14,710 --> 00:01:11,680 does leak 29 00:01:16,630 --> 00:01:14,720 hang on a sec here let me get to the uh 30 00:01:18,070 --> 00:01:16,640 yeah let me get to the right spot there 31 00:01:19,830 --> 00:01:18,080 yeah uh 32 00:01:21,670 --> 00:01:19,840 let's hope that it does leak because uh 33 00:01:23,350 --> 00:01:21,680 frankly uh the report was 34 00:01:25,590 --> 00:01:23,360 more than a little bit of a 35 00:01:27,350 --> 00:01:25,600 disappointment uh the other bit of news 36 00:01:31,109 --> 00:01:27,360 that that came out this week 37 00:01:34,310 --> 00:01:31,119 is the identity of the uh uh 38 00:01:36,149 --> 00:01:34,320 uap task force uh uh director 39 00:01:38,710 --> 00:01:36,159 uh that is someone named brennan 40 00:01:39,429 --> 00:01:38,720 mckernan uh he's a navy intelligence 41 00:01:42,630 --> 00:01:39,439 analyst 42 00:01:45,190 --> 00:01:42,640 so uh the report is his handiwork 43 00:01:46,310 --> 00:01:45,200 uh he was identified by politico as 44 00:01:49,990 --> 00:01:46,320 someone who 45 00:01:53,109 --> 00:01:50,000 uh was the uaptf director and he briefed 46 00:01:53,990 --> 00:01:53,119 uh congress uh not this past week but 47 00:01:56,230 --> 00:01:54,000 the week before 48 00:01:57,190 --> 00:01:56,240 he was one of the fellows involved in uh 49 00:02:00,630 --> 00:01:57,200 briefing 50 00:02:03,749 --> 00:02:00,640 uh the uh the house uh uh committee uh 51 00:02:04,709 --> 00:02:03,759 uh that uh uh on intelligence so uh that 52 00:02:06,870 --> 00:02:04,719 he did that 53 00:02:08,949 --> 00:02:06,880 so uh we know that uh this is his 54 00:02:11,670 --> 00:02:08,959 handiwork he is responsible 55 00:02:12,949 --> 00:02:11,680 uh for the report and now at the report 56 00:02:15,670 --> 00:02:12,959 it did come out 57 00:02:16,869 --> 00:02:15,680 it finally came out about uh you know 58 00:02:19,430 --> 00:02:16,879 what i was expecting 59 00:02:20,309 --> 00:02:19,440 it came out on friday uh right on time 60 00:02:24,229 --> 00:02:20,319 uh it just 61 00:02:25,910 --> 00:02:24,239 worked out pretty well i guess for the 62 00:02:27,750 --> 00:02:25,920 for the folks that put together the 63 00:02:29,030 --> 00:02:27,760 report that the deadline happened to 64 00:02:32,070 --> 00:02:29,040 fall at sort of a 65 00:02:34,229 --> 00:02:32,080 fortuitous time after uh biden got back 66 00:02:37,430 --> 00:02:34,239 from his overseas trips to europe 67 00:02:39,589 --> 00:02:37,440 and before the holiday so uh it's out it 68 00:02:41,430 --> 00:02:39,599 comes out on a friday uh again 69 00:02:43,030 --> 00:02:41,440 pretty fortuitous for them in terms of 70 00:02:46,550 --> 00:02:43,040 the timing and it's out 71 00:02:48,309 --> 00:02:46,560 and it's it is uh frankly it's a it's a 72 00:02:51,309 --> 00:02:48,319 disappointment uh uh what 73 00:02:53,670 --> 00:02:51,319 the senate requested was a public 74 00:02:56,869 --> 00:02:53,680 unclassified report 75 00:02:57,830 --> 00:02:56,879 with a classified annex and basically 76 00:03:01,690 --> 00:02:57,840 what we got 77 00:03:02,869 --> 00:03:01,700 was a class an unclassified public 78 00:03:05,830 --> 00:03:02,879 [Music] 79 00:03:06,470 --> 00:03:05,840 abstract executive summary and uh really 80 00:03:10,070 --> 00:03:06,480 uh the 81 00:03:12,390 --> 00:03:10,080 gonna are 82 00:03:14,309 --> 00:03:12,400 are obviously classified and let's hope 83 00:03:16,070 --> 00:03:14,319 that uh rubio is in fact correct that 84 00:03:18,070 --> 00:03:16,080 the full report does leak 85 00:03:19,670 --> 00:03:18,080 because uh that's really what we need to 86 00:03:22,949 --> 00:03:19,680 see uh certainly a 87 00:03:25,750 --> 00:03:22,959 few uh uh interesting 88 00:03:26,390 --> 00:03:25,760 uh interesting revelations within the 89 00:03:33,350 --> 00:03:26,400 report 90 00:03:35,990 --> 00:03:33,360 by page 91 00:03:38,710 --> 00:03:36,000 and what we've got uh obviously the it's 92 00:03:41,110 --> 00:03:38,720 a preliminary assessment so this is the 93 00:03:42,710 --> 00:03:41,120 uh first uh volley back to the senate 94 00:03:45,110 --> 00:03:42,720 that they asked for this report 95 00:03:46,949 --> 00:03:45,120 uh they've got it and it's from the 96 00:03:47,910 --> 00:03:46,959 office of the director of national 97 00:03:51,030 --> 00:03:47,920 intelligence 98 00:03:53,030 --> 00:03:51,040 preliminary assessment so it's a 99 00:03:54,630 --> 00:03:53,040 fine fine looking cover page there i 100 00:03:57,910 --> 00:03:54,640 must say and 101 00:04:02,869 --> 00:03:57,920 let's uh uh let's keep going and get to 102 00:04:06,070 --> 00:04:02,879 page one on this and uh basically 103 00:04:07,350 --> 00:04:06,080 let's see here okay the preliminary 104 00:04:09,509 --> 00:04:07,360 report is provided 105 00:04:11,110 --> 00:04:09,519 by the office of the director of 106 00:04:13,270 --> 00:04:11,120 national intelligence 107 00:04:15,670 --> 00:04:13,280 uh provides an overview for policy 108 00:04:17,749 --> 00:04:15,680 makers of the challenges associated 109 00:04:19,749 --> 00:04:17,759 with characterizing the potential threat 110 00:04:22,550 --> 00:04:19,759 posed by uap 111 00:04:23,830 --> 00:04:22,560 the director is the accountable official 112 00:04:25,670 --> 00:04:23,840 for ensuring 113 00:04:27,189 --> 00:04:25,680 uh the timely collection and 114 00:04:30,310 --> 00:04:27,199 consolidation of data 115 00:04:30,950 --> 00:04:30,320 on uap so they're taking responsibility 116 00:04:34,230 --> 00:04:30,960 there 117 00:04:37,270 --> 00:04:34,240 and uh the odni uh 118 00:04:38,790 --> 00:04:37,280 uh prepared this report for the 119 00:04:40,150 --> 00:04:38,800 congressional intelligence and armed 120 00:04:43,189 --> 00:04:40,160 services committee 121 00:04:44,629 --> 00:04:43,199 and uh basically uh that uh that's uh 122 00:04:45,749 --> 00:04:44,639 the scope of the report and the 123 00:04:48,230 --> 00:04:45,759 assumptions uh 124 00:04:50,710 --> 00:04:48,240 various forms of sensors that uh 125 00:04:51,990 --> 00:04:50,720 register uap generally operate correctly 126 00:04:54,950 --> 00:04:52,000 and capture enough 127 00:04:55,670 --> 00:04:54,960 real data to allow initial assessments 128 00:04:59,189 --> 00:04:55,680 but some 129 00:05:05,909 --> 00:04:59,199 uap may be attributable to 130 00:05:10,070 --> 00:05:08,629 and let me go over to page 2 here i got 131 00:05:11,990 --> 00:05:10,080 to jump back and forth because this 132 00:05:17,029 --> 00:05:12,000 print is way too small to read 133 00:05:20,870 --> 00:05:18,390 in the software that you're getting to 134 00:05:23,189 --> 00:05:20,880 see uh executive summary 135 00:05:23,990 --> 00:05:23,199 of the limited amount of high quality 136 00:05:26,710 --> 00:05:24,000 reporting 137 00:05:32,870 --> 00:05:26,720 on unidentified aerial phenomena hampers 138 00:05:36,629 --> 00:05:35,110 because the reporting lacked sufficient 139 00:05:38,629 --> 00:05:36,639 specificity 140 00:05:41,670 --> 00:05:38,639 ultimately recognize that a unique 141 00:05:45,110 --> 00:05:41,680 tailored reporting process was required 142 00:05:45,990 --> 00:05:45,120 uh the ua the task force concentrated 143 00:05:49,629 --> 00:05:46,000 its review 144 00:05:50,790 --> 00:05:49,639 on reports that occurred uh from 2004 to 145 00:05:52,550 --> 00:05:50,800 2021. 146 00:05:54,629 --> 00:05:52,560 we had heard roughly 20 years and that's 147 00:05:57,670 --> 00:05:54,639 about 17 years that's close enough 148 00:05:59,749 --> 00:05:57,680 uh in the uh new york times story that 149 00:06:01,670 --> 00:05:59,759 provided a little bit of background 150 00:06:03,029 --> 00:06:01,680 going in the numbers aren't exactly 151 00:06:06,230 --> 00:06:03,039 correct but they're close enough 152 00:06:08,390 --> 00:06:06,240 they went back to 2004. most of the uap 153 00:06:10,629 --> 00:06:08,400 reported probably do represent physical 154 00:06:13,270 --> 00:06:10,639 objects given that a majority of uap 155 00:06:14,309 --> 00:06:13,280 uh registered across multiple sensors 156 00:06:17,110 --> 00:06:14,319 including radar 157 00:06:17,909 --> 00:06:17,120 infrared electro optical weapon seekers 158 00:06:21,430 --> 00:06:17,919 and visual 159 00:06:23,110 --> 00:06:21,440 observation so uh you know 160 00:06:24,710 --> 00:06:23,120 they're they're pointing that out you 161 00:06:27,749 --> 00:06:24,720 know they just seemed to 162 00:06:29,189 --> 00:06:27,759 uh earlier on uh saying that 163 00:06:31,670 --> 00:06:29,199 there's an assumption that maybe this 164 00:06:35,590 --> 00:06:31,680 stuff isn't entirely working correctly 165 00:06:38,870 --> 00:06:35,600 on all these cases but then they do 166 00:06:41,270 --> 00:06:38,880 say hey multiple sensors so 167 00:06:42,870 --> 00:06:41,280 hey those multiple sensors represent the 168 00:06:45,749 --> 00:06:42,880 collection of physical evidence let's 169 00:06:48,230 --> 00:06:45,759 keep that in mind it's physical evidence 170 00:06:49,909 --> 00:06:48,240 uh in a limited number of incidents uaps 171 00:06:52,870 --> 00:06:49,919 reportedly appeared to exhibit 172 00:06:54,390 --> 00:06:52,880 unusual flight characteristics uh what 173 00:06:56,790 --> 00:06:54,400 does that mean exactly 174 00:06:58,070 --> 00:06:56,800 you know unusual is that uh supersonic 175 00:07:00,629 --> 00:06:58,080 speeds is that uh 176 00:07:02,710 --> 00:07:00,639 instantaneous acceleration is that right 177 00:07:05,270 --> 00:07:02,720 angle turns at high speeds 178 00:07:07,189 --> 00:07:05,280 uh you know uh climbs that are 179 00:07:07,909 --> 00:07:07,199 impossible for normal aircraft uh that 180 00:07:10,309 --> 00:07:07,919 kind of thing 181 00:07:11,830 --> 00:07:10,319 uh you know anything uh well let's put 182 00:07:14,710 --> 00:07:11,840 it this way uh 183 00:07:16,550 --> 00:07:14,720 to climb at a 45 degree angle that's a 184 00:07:18,790 --> 00:07:16,560 that's an advanced uh 185 00:07:20,230 --> 00:07:18,800 advanced aircraft for sure and then 186 00:07:23,110 --> 00:07:20,240 anything higher than that 187 00:07:25,589 --> 00:07:23,120 basically uh you know it really raises 188 00:07:29,189 --> 00:07:25,599 some eyebrows 189 00:07:29,430 --> 00:07:29,199 uh so but again uh the forward facing 190 00:07:32,629 --> 00:07:29,440 the 191 00:07:35,189 --> 00:07:32,639 doesn't uh 192 00:07:36,390 --> 00:07:35,199 discuss uh anything as far as the uh 193 00:07:38,710 --> 00:07:36,400 specificity 194 00:07:40,469 --> 00:07:38,720 of the these flight characteristics so 195 00:07:42,150 --> 00:07:40,479 again that's something that 196 00:07:43,990 --> 00:07:42,160 you know you would think should be in a 197 00:07:44,790 --> 00:07:44,000 public report that no reason not to 198 00:07:46,469 --> 00:07:44,800 include it 199 00:07:48,150 --> 00:07:46,479 but it's not included so these 200 00:07:49,830 --> 00:07:48,160 observations could be the result of 201 00:07:53,430 --> 00:07:49,840 sensor errors spoofing 202 00:07:56,309 --> 00:07:53,440 uh observer misperceptions and require 203 00:07:58,869 --> 00:07:56,319 additional rigorous analysis so the 204 00:08:00,629 --> 00:07:58,879 unusual flight characteristics uh 205 00:08:02,070 --> 00:08:00,639 that that seems to be where the 206 00:08:05,430 --> 00:08:02,080 potentially uh uh 207 00:08:08,309 --> 00:08:05,440 you uh et ufos uh are going that's uh 208 00:08:10,309 --> 00:08:08,319 that's the bag that they're gonna be in 209 00:08:12,710 --> 00:08:10,319 but uh again uh they're not uh 210 00:08:14,150 --> 00:08:12,720 you know just not a lot of specifics 211 00:08:16,230 --> 00:08:14,160 there there are probably 212 00:08:17,909 --> 00:08:16,240 multiple types of uaps requiring 213 00:08:19,909 --> 00:08:17,919 different explanations based on the 214 00:08:22,309 --> 00:08:19,919 range of appearances and behaviors 215 00:08:24,070 --> 00:08:22,319 described in the available reporting uh 216 00:08:24,869 --> 00:08:24,080 you know obviously and not all of these 217 00:08:27,430 --> 00:08:24,879 are going to have 218 00:08:28,230 --> 00:08:27,440 otherworldly flight characteristics uh 219 00:08:31,430 --> 00:08:28,240 some of them 220 00:08:34,389 --> 00:08:31,440 are are you know they are likely 221 00:08:35,430 --> 00:08:34,399 foreign reconnaissance advanced drones 222 00:08:37,750 --> 00:08:35,440 and even advanced 223 00:08:39,750 --> 00:08:37,760 balloons that type of thing to gather 224 00:08:42,790 --> 00:08:39,760 data for our adversaries like 225 00:08:45,590 --> 00:08:42,800 russia perhaps like china but 226 00:08:46,949 --> 00:08:45,600 our analysis of the data supports the 227 00:08:49,590 --> 00:08:46,959 construct that if and when 228 00:08:50,389 --> 00:08:49,600 individual uap incidents are resolved 229 00:08:52,710 --> 00:08:50,399 they will fall 230 00:08:53,750 --> 00:08:52,720 into one of five potential explanatory 231 00:08:57,430 --> 00:08:53,760 categories 232 00:08:58,870 --> 00:08:57,440 airborne clutter not i'm not really sure 233 00:09:00,470 --> 00:08:58,880 airborne clutter i'm not really sure 234 00:09:03,350 --> 00:09:00,480 what they're talking about there 235 00:09:05,509 --> 00:09:03,360 uh natural atmospheric phenomenon uh you 236 00:09:08,470 --> 00:09:05,519 know when you've got a 237 00:09:09,269 --> 00:09:08,480 sensor and visual target i'm not sure 238 00:09:11,750 --> 00:09:09,279 how 239 00:09:13,670 --> 00:09:11,760 many of those will be explained by 240 00:09:15,750 --> 00:09:13,680 natural atmospheric phenomena 241 00:09:17,829 --> 00:09:15,760 you know maybe one maybe the other but 242 00:09:20,870 --> 00:09:17,839 both i'm not so sure about that 243 00:09:23,990 --> 00:09:20,880 uh usg or us industry 244 00:09:27,190 --> 00:09:24,000 uh industry developmental programs 245 00:09:29,509 --> 00:09:27,200 we've been hearing that the the 246 00:09:30,870 --> 00:09:29,519 report is going to rule out any of our 247 00:09:32,870 --> 00:09:30,880 own potential gear 248 00:09:34,389 --> 00:09:32,880 that is apparently not the case that 249 00:09:36,230 --> 00:09:34,399 hasn't been done here 250 00:09:37,590 --> 00:09:36,240 foreign adversary systems of course 251 00:09:40,630 --> 00:09:37,600 that's a possibility 252 00:09:41,990 --> 00:09:40,640 and uh then the uh the other bin uh so 253 00:09:44,630 --> 00:09:42,000 they're they're calling these bins and 254 00:09:45,030 --> 00:09:44,640 not bags okay so uh a little discrepancy 255 00:09:47,030 --> 00:09:45,040 there 256 00:09:48,150 --> 00:09:47,040 others uh they are others so and that's 257 00:09:51,750 --> 00:09:48,160 uh that's where our 258 00:09:54,790 --> 00:09:51,760 et uh uh uh is uh likely to be found 259 00:09:56,310 --> 00:09:54,800 uh the uap uh clearly cl uh pose a uh 260 00:09:58,070 --> 00:09:56,320 flight safety issue 261 00:09:59,910 --> 00:09:58,080 and uh yeah that that sort of goes 262 00:10:02,389 --> 00:09:59,920 without saying it's understood 263 00:10:04,069 --> 00:10:02,399 uh they're uh in terms of flight safety 264 00:10:06,150 --> 00:10:04,079 uh uh civilian or military 265 00:10:08,790 --> 00:10:06,160 their fanatics about it and of course 266 00:10:10,949 --> 00:10:08,800 what also falls into the category of 267 00:10:11,990 --> 00:10:10,959 potential flight safety issues things 268 00:10:13,750 --> 00:10:12,000 like birds 269 00:10:15,110 --> 00:10:13,760 things like weather that type of thing 270 00:10:18,069 --> 00:10:15,120 so this is 271 00:10:19,750 --> 00:10:18,079 not something that too many pilots and 272 00:10:22,630 --> 00:10:19,760 certainly no american citizens 273 00:10:23,190 --> 00:10:22,640 should be uh losing any sleepover but uh 274 00:10:26,389 --> 00:10:23,200 it uh 275 00:10:28,630 --> 00:10:26,399 it it's in there so uh it is brought up 276 00:10:29,990 --> 00:10:28,640 the safety concerns primarily center on 277 00:10:32,870 --> 00:10:30,000 aviators contending 278 00:10:33,670 --> 00:10:32,880 with an increasingly uh cluttered air 279 00:10:36,150 --> 00:10:33,680 domain 280 00:10:37,350 --> 00:10:36,160 a uap would also represent a national 281 00:10:40,389 --> 00:10:37,360 security challenge 282 00:10:42,630 --> 00:10:40,399 if they're foreign adversaries uh okay a 283 00:10:44,310 --> 00:10:42,640 consistent consolidation of reports 284 00:10:46,710 --> 00:10:44,320 from across the federal government 285 00:10:48,550 --> 00:10:46,720 standardizing reports blah blah blah 286 00:10:50,550 --> 00:10:48,560 uh the the they're talking about the 287 00:10:52,310 --> 00:10:50,560 importance of that well you know i mean 288 00:10:53,590 --> 00:10:52,320 honestly they've had 40 years to get 289 00:10:55,509 --> 00:10:53,600 this sort of thing done 290 00:10:57,110 --> 00:10:55,519 and this is where we are with that right 291 00:10:59,269 --> 00:10:57,120 now so uh 292 00:11:00,150 --> 00:10:59,279 some statements of the obvious uh some 293 00:11:03,110 --> 00:11:00,160 interesting uh 294 00:11:04,230 --> 00:11:03,120 allusions to uh uh unusual flight 295 00:11:06,630 --> 00:11:04,240 characteristics 296 00:11:09,750 --> 00:11:06,640 not a whole lot more than that uh at 297 00:11:12,550 --> 00:11:09,760 least up to page two 298 00:11:13,350 --> 00:11:12,560 on page three we start to get into some 299 00:11:16,230 --> 00:11:13,360 numbers here 300 00:11:17,509 --> 00:11:16,240 available reporting largely inconclusive 301 00:11:21,030 --> 00:11:17,519 limited data 302 00:11:22,949 --> 00:11:21,040 leaves most uap unexplained so 303 00:11:25,030 --> 00:11:22,959 limited data and inconsistency in 304 00:11:26,870 --> 00:11:25,040 reporting are key challenges 305 00:11:28,150 --> 00:11:26,880 uh well i can understand that there's 306 00:11:31,430 --> 00:11:28,160 some inconsistency 307 00:11:31,910 --> 00:11:31,440 in the reporting and uh limited data 308 00:11:34,790 --> 00:11:31,920 well 309 00:11:36,310 --> 00:11:34,800 you know honestly uh the uh the uh i'm 310 00:11:39,110 --> 00:11:36,320 not uh so sure that uh 311 00:11:40,069 --> 00:11:39,120 there there's al all that uh a larger 312 00:11:43,269 --> 00:11:40,079 number of uh 313 00:11:44,230 --> 00:11:43,279 et ufos that the number is probably not 314 00:11:46,630 --> 00:11:44,240 all that small 315 00:11:48,630 --> 00:11:46,640 or not all that large but uh what you do 316 00:11:50,710 --> 00:11:48,640 is you have a larger pile when you go 317 00:11:51,269 --> 00:11:50,720 back over time it that builds up over 318 00:11:54,629 --> 00:11:51,279 time 319 00:11:57,350 --> 00:11:54,639 uh how many how many of these cases are 320 00:11:58,790 --> 00:11:57,360 really uh e.t ufos uh you know who knows 321 00:12:01,269 --> 00:11:58,800 uh one a month uh 322 00:12:02,150 --> 00:12:01,279 maybe two a month uh can't say for sure 323 00:12:04,310 --> 00:12:02,160 we don't know 324 00:12:05,829 --> 00:12:04,320 uh because uh what the limited data they 325 00:12:07,829 --> 00:12:05,839 have they're not sharing so 326 00:12:10,150 --> 00:12:07,839 there's no way for us to uh determine 327 00:12:12,710 --> 00:12:10,160 that uh you know all i can say is uh 328 00:12:13,430 --> 00:12:12,720 yeah it's got to be uh uh somewhere 329 00:12:16,230 --> 00:12:13,440 between 330 00:12:17,750 --> 00:12:16,240 uh on the uh the bottom end enough for 331 00:12:20,150 --> 00:12:17,760 them to start paying attention 332 00:12:21,269 --> 00:12:20,160 and on the top end it can't not enough 333 00:12:23,590 --> 00:12:21,279 for them to have 334 00:12:24,310 --> 00:12:23,600 uh really made a uh a high priority of 335 00:12:26,710 --> 00:12:24,320 this 336 00:12:29,509 --> 00:12:26,720 uh going out from way back when so uh 337 00:12:31,430 --> 00:12:29,519 the air force uh subsequent let's see uh 338 00:12:33,269 --> 00:12:31,440 maybe let's see uh no uh standardized 339 00:12:36,470 --> 00:12:33,279 reporting mechanism existed 340 00:12:39,910 --> 00:12:36,480 until the navy established one in march 341 00:12:42,230 --> 00:12:39,920 2019 and that that is technically true 342 00:12:44,550 --> 00:12:42,240 uh a lot of times uh what you would have 343 00:12:48,069 --> 00:12:44,560 with the uh unusual cases uh 344 00:12:50,310 --> 00:12:48,079 uh the bad people would just uh uh 345 00:12:52,310 --> 00:12:50,320 file op rep three reports so we've 346 00:12:55,590 --> 00:12:52,320 talked about that at some length uh 347 00:12:57,190 --> 00:12:55,600 uh kevin day uh from the nimitz case 348 00:13:00,069 --> 00:12:57,200 said he was at least considering 349 00:13:01,030 --> 00:13:00,079 uh filing an op rep 3 report never did 350 00:13:04,069 --> 00:13:01,040 uh 351 00:13:05,110 --> 00:13:04,079 some sometimes these opera iii reports 352 00:13:07,350 --> 00:13:05,120 have been foiled out 353 00:13:08,710 --> 00:13:07,360 uh paul dean is uh uh known for doing 354 00:13:11,269 --> 00:13:08,720 that kind of thing 355 00:13:13,750 --> 00:13:11,279 and uh he's found he's developed some 356 00:13:15,910 --> 00:13:13,760 interesting cases as a result of uh 357 00:13:18,389 --> 00:13:15,920 looking at op rep three reports but 358 00:13:21,269 --> 00:13:18,399 again not standardized so uh that 359 00:13:23,509 --> 00:13:21,279 that is uh uh correct although you know 360 00:13:25,670 --> 00:13:23,519 the reports do still get filed 361 00:13:27,670 --> 00:13:25,680 uh the air force subsequently adopted 362 00:13:30,470 --> 00:13:27,680 the uh a mechanism in 363 00:13:30,949 --> 00:13:30,480 november 2020 but it remains limited to 364 00:13:33,430 --> 00:13:30,959 uh 365 00:13:34,310 --> 00:13:33,440 us government reporting i'm not sure 366 00:13:37,430 --> 00:13:34,320 exactly 367 00:13:39,350 --> 00:13:37,440 what that means uh 368 00:13:40,790 --> 00:13:39,360 okay so they i'm not sure what that 369 00:13:42,949 --> 00:13:40,800 means actually it's a little bit the 370 00:13:45,910 --> 00:13:42,959 language is a little vague there 371 00:13:47,670 --> 00:13:45,920 and uh the the task force regularly 372 00:13:49,269 --> 00:13:47,680 heard anecdotally 373 00:13:50,870 --> 00:13:49,279 during its research about other 374 00:13:53,430 --> 00:13:50,880 observations that occurred 375 00:13:55,670 --> 00:13:53,440 but which were never captured in formal 376 00:13:56,389 --> 00:13:55,680 or informal uh reporting by those 377 00:13:58,710 --> 00:13:56,399 observers 378 00:14:00,069 --> 00:13:58,720 so yeah i'm sure that's the case as well 379 00:14:02,069 --> 00:14:00,079 that people just 380 00:14:04,230 --> 00:14:02,079 just didn't file a report there they saw 381 00:14:06,949 --> 00:14:04,240 something they uh 382 00:14:08,150 --> 00:14:06,959 captured something on some remote 383 00:14:10,470 --> 00:14:08,160 sensing gear that 384 00:14:11,590 --> 00:14:10,480 they were monitoring and they just never 385 00:14:13,110 --> 00:14:11,600 filed a report 386 00:14:15,430 --> 00:14:13,120 after carefully considering this 387 00:14:17,829 --> 00:14:15,440 information the task force focused 388 00:14:20,470 --> 00:14:17,839 on reports that involved uap largely 389 00:14:22,550 --> 00:14:20,480 witnessed firsthand by military aviators 390 00:14:24,230 --> 00:14:22,560 and that were collected from systems we 391 00:14:26,310 --> 00:14:24,240 considered to be reliable 392 00:14:28,710 --> 00:14:26,320 these reports describe incidents that 393 00:14:30,710 --> 00:14:28,720 occurred between 04 and 21 394 00:14:32,150 --> 00:14:30,720 would the majority coming in the last 395 00:14:34,069 --> 00:14:32,160 two years 396 00:14:36,870 --> 00:14:34,079 as the new reporting mechanism became 397 00:14:39,990 --> 00:14:36,880 better known to the aviation community 398 00:14:42,230 --> 00:14:40,000 we're able to identify one report 399 00:14:43,269 --> 00:14:42,240 reported uap with high confidence in 400 00:14:45,350 --> 00:14:43,279 that case 401 00:14:46,470 --> 00:14:45,360 we identified the object as a large 402 00:14:50,150 --> 00:14:46,480 deflating 403 00:14:52,790 --> 00:14:50,160 unexplained 404 00:14:55,110 --> 00:14:52,800 so we've got 144 cases and most of them 405 00:14:58,550 --> 00:14:55,120 within the last two years 406 00:14:59,269 --> 00:14:58,560 144 of them originated with government 407 00:15:01,990 --> 00:14:59,279 sources 408 00:15:03,590 --> 00:15:02,000 of these 80 reports involved observation 409 00:15:06,310 --> 00:15:03,600 with multiple sensors 410 00:15:07,350 --> 00:15:06,320 most reports described uap as objects 411 00:15:10,470 --> 00:15:07,360 that interrupted 412 00:15:11,590 --> 00:15:10,480 pre-planned training or other military 413 00:15:14,670 --> 00:15:11,600 activity 414 00:15:16,629 --> 00:15:14,680 and then the collection challenged uh 415 00:15:19,590 --> 00:15:16,639 socio-cultural stigmas and 416 00:15:22,870 --> 00:15:19,600 uh sensor limitations remained obstacles 417 00:15:24,470 --> 00:15:22,880 and collecting data on uap 418 00:15:25,990 --> 00:15:24,480 well i can understand the first i'm not 419 00:15:27,990 --> 00:15:26,000 sure what the the sensor 420 00:15:29,749 --> 00:15:28,000 limitations i mean hey if you capture it 421 00:15:31,670 --> 00:15:29,759 you capture it if you don't you don't 422 00:15:32,870 --> 00:15:31,680 then you've got the sensor information 423 00:15:34,949 --> 00:15:32,880 so you know 424 00:15:36,310 --> 00:15:34,959 what uh what uh what are they asking for 425 00:15:39,670 --> 00:15:36,320 here uh you know 426 00:15:39,990 --> 00:15:39,680 sensors that can do a lot more than the 427 00:15:41,990 --> 00:15:40,000 current 428 00:15:43,670 --> 00:15:42,000 centers that they've already spent a ton 429 00:15:46,150 --> 00:15:43,680 of money on although some 430 00:15:48,230 --> 00:15:46,160 technical challenges such as how to 431 00:15:48,870 --> 00:15:48,240 appropriately filter out radar clutter 432 00:15:51,030 --> 00:15:48,880 to 433 00:15:52,389 --> 00:15:51,040 ensure a safety of flight for military 434 00:15:55,030 --> 00:15:52,399 and civilian traffic 435 00:15:56,870 --> 00:15:55,040 uh civilian aircraft are long-standing 436 00:15:59,829 --> 00:15:56,880 as the aviation community 437 00:16:00,790 --> 00:15:59,839 while others are unique to uh uap 438 00:16:02,710 --> 00:16:00,800 problem set 439 00:16:04,069 --> 00:16:02,720 uh narratives from aviators in the 440 00:16:06,870 --> 00:16:04,079 operational community 441 00:16:07,590 --> 00:16:06,880 uh describe a disparagement uh okay 442 00:16:09,829 --> 00:16:07,600 sensors 443 00:16:12,230 --> 00:16:09,839 mounted on military platforms are 444 00:16:12,949 --> 00:16:12,240 typically designed to fulfill specific 445 00:16:14,629 --> 00:16:12,959 missions 446 00:16:17,430 --> 00:16:14,639 as a result those sensors are not 447 00:16:21,110 --> 00:16:17,440 generally suited for identifying uap 448 00:16:22,949 --> 00:16:21,120 well i think the key is really that 449 00:16:24,389 --> 00:16:22,959 you're identifying that something is 450 00:16:26,389 --> 00:16:24,399 there uh that 451 00:16:28,629 --> 00:16:26,399 that's an intelligently controlled 452 00:16:32,230 --> 00:16:28,639 vehicle and that it's flying and 453 00:16:35,030 --> 00:16:32,240 you know it'd be nice to uh be able to 454 00:16:35,990 --> 00:16:35,040 identify the uh the et spaceship is 455 00:16:38,870 --> 00:16:36,000 coming from 456 00:16:40,470 --> 00:16:38,880 alpha centauri or the the sagittarius 457 00:16:42,710 --> 00:16:40,480 system or something like that 458 00:16:43,509 --> 00:16:42,720 but uh you know the fact that you're 459 00:16:45,670 --> 00:16:43,519 getting it 460 00:16:46,710 --> 00:16:45,680 on sensor data and maybe also at the 461 00:16:48,470 --> 00:16:46,720 same time 462 00:16:49,990 --> 00:16:48,480 having somebody see something that in 463 00:16:52,230 --> 00:16:50,000 and of itself is significant 464 00:16:54,470 --> 00:16:52,240 okay and yeah you might not be able to 465 00:16:56,949 --> 00:16:54,480 specifically identify those but 466 00:16:59,030 --> 00:16:56,959 it's certainly worth cataloging them uh 467 00:17:00,949 --> 00:16:59,040 and then set your vantage points and the 468 00:17:01,670 --> 00:17:00,959 number of sensors concurrently observing 469 00:17:04,710 --> 00:17:01,680 an object 470 00:17:06,870 --> 00:17:04,720 play substantial roles as a in 471 00:17:08,230 --> 00:17:06,880 distinguishing uap from known objects 472 00:17:10,230 --> 00:17:08,240 and determining whether a 473 00:17:11,350 --> 00:17:10,240 uap demonstrates breakthrough 474 00:17:13,110 --> 00:17:11,360 capabilities 475 00:17:14,870 --> 00:17:13,120 optical sensors have the benefit of 476 00:17:15,590 --> 00:17:14,880 providing some insight into relative 477 00:17:17,909 --> 00:17:15,600 size 478 00:17:19,510 --> 00:17:17,919 shape and structure and also flight 479 00:17:21,270 --> 00:17:19,520 characteristics if you can figure out 480 00:17:21,750 --> 00:17:21,280 the size the shape and the structure or 481 00:17:23,829 --> 00:17:21,760 something 482 00:17:24,789 --> 00:17:23,839 uh you can figure out how fast it's 483 00:17:27,510 --> 00:17:24,799 going and uh 484 00:17:28,950 --> 00:17:27,520 uh you know what its rate of climb is 485 00:17:31,750 --> 00:17:28,960 and things like that uh 486 00:17:32,710 --> 00:17:31,760 okay and uh uh radio frequency sensors 487 00:17:35,029 --> 00:17:32,720 uh provide 488 00:17:35,830 --> 00:17:35,039 more accuracy of the more accurate 489 00:17:38,870 --> 00:17:35,840 velocity 490 00:17:40,230 --> 00:17:38,880 and range information so okay so there's 491 00:17:53,190 --> 00:17:40,240 that 492 00:17:57,430 --> 00:17:55,110 some potential patterns do emerge 493 00:17:59,110 --> 00:17:57,440 although there was a wide variability in 494 00:18:01,590 --> 00:17:59,120 the reports in the data set 495 00:18:02,789 --> 00:18:01,600 is currently too limited to allow for 496 00:18:05,510 --> 00:18:02,799 detailed trends or 497 00:18:06,950 --> 00:18:05,520 pattern analysis there was some 498 00:18:09,990 --> 00:18:06,960 clustering of uap 499 00:18:11,590 --> 00:18:10,000 observations regarding shape size and 500 00:18:13,909 --> 00:18:11,600 that particularly propulsion 501 00:18:14,630 --> 00:18:13,919 uap sightings also tended to cluster 502 00:18:16,789 --> 00:18:14,640 around us 503 00:18:17,990 --> 00:18:16,799 training and testing grounds but we 504 00:18:20,870 --> 00:18:18,000 assess that 505 00:18:22,870 --> 00:18:20,880 this may result from a collection bias 506 00:18:23,909 --> 00:18:22,880 as a result of focused attention greater 507 00:18:26,150 --> 00:18:23,919 number of 508 00:18:27,190 --> 00:18:26,160 uh latest generation sensors operating 509 00:18:30,870 --> 00:18:27,200 in these areas 510 00:18:32,230 --> 00:18:30,880 and uh so on and so forth uh basically 511 00:18:34,630 --> 00:18:32,240 uh they're saying there's a collection 512 00:18:36,950 --> 00:18:34,640 bias uh because uh you know that's where 513 00:18:40,150 --> 00:18:36,960 we have our sensors well yeah obviously 514 00:18:42,310 --> 00:18:40,160 so uh yeah uh i don't know what to say 515 00:18:45,590 --> 00:18:42,320 about that that's sort of uh 516 00:18:47,190 --> 00:18:45,600 you know uh yeah yeah you're going to 517 00:18:48,870 --> 00:18:47,200 collect sensor data where you have 518 00:18:49,430 --> 00:18:48,880 sensors okay that seems to be what it's 519 00:18:51,909 --> 00:18:49,440 saying and 520 00:18:52,870 --> 00:18:51,919 there may be a bias in that if you want 521 00:18:55,430 --> 00:18:52,880 to study 522 00:18:56,150 --> 00:18:55,440 uh ufos where you don't have sensors 523 00:18:58,470 --> 00:18:56,160 okay 524 00:18:59,909 --> 00:18:58,480 uh that that doesn't make a whole lot of 525 00:19:02,789 --> 00:18:59,919 sense to me if it does to you 526 00:19:05,110 --> 00:19:02,799 let me know uh in 18 incidents uh uh 527 00:19:05,590 --> 00:19:05,120 described in 11 reports observers 528 00:19:07,909 --> 00:19:05,600 reported 529 00:19:09,190 --> 00:19:07,919 unusual uap pattern movements or 530 00:19:10,310 --> 00:19:09,200 movement patterns or flight 531 00:19:12,870 --> 00:19:10,320 characteristics 532 00:19:13,990 --> 00:19:12,880 some uap appeared to remain stationary 533 00:19:16,710 --> 00:19:14,000 and winds aloft 534 00:19:17,430 --> 00:19:16,720 move against the wind maneuver abruptly 535 00:19:20,070 --> 00:19:17,440 or 536 00:19:21,990 --> 00:19:20,080 move at considerable speed without the 537 00:19:23,990 --> 00:19:22,000 discernible means of propulsion 538 00:19:25,909 --> 00:19:24,000 in a small number of cases military 539 00:19:27,270 --> 00:19:25,919 aircraft systems processed radio 540 00:19:30,390 --> 00:19:27,280 frequency energy 541 00:19:34,150 --> 00:19:30,400 uh associated with uap sightings 542 00:19:35,029 --> 00:19:34,160 uh ua uh task force holds a small amount 543 00:19:38,230 --> 00:19:35,039 of data 544 00:19:40,710 --> 00:19:38,240 that appear to show uap demonstrating 545 00:19:41,669 --> 00:19:40,720 acceleration or a degree of signature 546 00:19:44,710 --> 00:19:41,679 management 547 00:19:45,990 --> 00:19:44,720 uh by that i would assume and again it 548 00:19:47,909 --> 00:19:46,000 doesn't say i mean 549 00:19:49,110 --> 00:19:47,919 it's a public-facing report about some 550 00:19:50,710 --> 00:19:49,120 basic stuff here 551 00:19:52,710 --> 00:19:50,720 and it should say it i shouldn't have to 552 00:19:55,190 --> 00:19:52,720 guess what this stuff means 553 00:19:56,789 --> 00:19:55,200 demonstrating acceleration or a degree 554 00:19:59,510 --> 00:19:56,799 of signature management 555 00:20:01,029 --> 00:19:59,520 does that mean that it accelerates and 556 00:20:02,549 --> 00:20:01,039 breaks the sound barrier but doesn't 557 00:20:04,549 --> 00:20:02,559 leave a sonic boom 558 00:20:06,149 --> 00:20:04,559 that sounds like that's what that means 559 00:20:09,149 --> 00:20:06,159 but it doesn't say it i mean 560 00:20:10,390 --> 00:20:09,159 you know a lot of this is a very 561 00:20:13,830 --> 00:20:10,400 dissatisfactory 562 00:20:15,830 --> 00:20:13,840 uh additional you know you know this 563 00:20:17,510 --> 00:20:15,840 this is supposedly a report it should 564 00:20:18,710 --> 00:20:17,520 clear this stuff up not raise more 565 00:20:20,710 --> 00:20:18,720 questions like what 566 00:20:22,470 --> 00:20:20,720 what are you even talking about here 567 00:20:23,190 --> 00:20:22,480 additional rigorous analysis was 568 00:20:25,190 --> 00:20:23,200 necessary 569 00:20:26,789 --> 00:20:25,200 uh by multiple teams or groups of 570 00:20:28,870 --> 00:20:26,799 technical experts to determine the 571 00:20:30,630 --> 00:20:28,880 nature and validity of these data 572 00:20:32,950 --> 00:20:30,640 we are conducting further analysis 573 00:20:34,710 --> 00:20:32,960 determine to determine if breakthrough 574 00:20:36,230 --> 00:20:34,720 technologies were demonstrated 575 00:20:37,990 --> 00:20:36,240 so yeah that's what i think they're 576 00:20:39,430 --> 00:20:38,000 talking about there and 577 00:20:41,110 --> 00:20:39,440 they can't figure out how something 578 00:20:43,510 --> 00:20:41,120 could be hovering and then 579 00:20:44,470 --> 00:20:43,520 excuse me a hitting you know maybe mach 580 00:20:46,390 --> 00:20:44,480 2 uh 581 00:20:48,070 --> 00:20:46,400 in a very short order and not leaving 582 00:20:50,310 --> 00:20:48,080 sonic booms behind so 583 00:20:52,310 --> 00:20:50,320 apparently there are cases like that but 584 00:20:53,590 --> 00:20:52,320 again it's not clear it seems pretty 585 00:20:55,430 --> 00:20:53,600 simple and straightforward 586 00:20:56,870 --> 00:20:55,440 that you should be able to say it but 587 00:21:00,230 --> 00:20:56,880 they're not saying it 588 00:21:01,510 --> 00:21:00,240 uh uap documented in this limited data 589 00:21:04,470 --> 00:21:01,520 set demonstrated an 590 00:21:06,390 --> 00:21:04,480 array of aerial behaviors reinforcing 591 00:21:07,350 --> 00:21:06,400 the possibility there are multiple types 592 00:21:09,510 --> 00:21:07,360 of uap 593 00:21:10,630 --> 00:21:09,520 uh requiring different explanations but 594 00:21:12,549 --> 00:21:10,640 sure you know 595 00:21:14,230 --> 00:21:12,559 some of them are the recon types i'm 596 00:21:17,430 --> 00:21:14,240 sure that the uh the 597 00:21:20,390 --> 00:21:17,440 the earth made uh reconnaissance drones 598 00:21:22,549 --> 00:21:20,400 and balloons and some of them are e.t 599 00:21:23,830 --> 00:21:22,559 so our analysis of the data supports the 600 00:21:26,230 --> 00:21:23,840 construct that if and when 601 00:21:28,549 --> 00:21:26,240 individual uap incidents are resolved 602 00:21:30,310 --> 00:21:28,559 they will fall into one of five 603 00:21:31,830 --> 00:21:30,320 categories and uh we already uh we 604 00:21:35,350 --> 00:21:31,840 already went through all that 605 00:21:37,750 --> 00:21:35,360 and uh this goes into more detail 606 00:21:39,190 --> 00:21:37,760 about them so this is just basically a 607 00:21:42,070 --> 00:21:39,200 reiteration of uh 608 00:21:45,350 --> 00:21:42,080 uh what was uh already outlined earlier 609 00:21:47,669 --> 00:21:45,360 so again 610 00:21:53,750 --> 00:21:47,679 they're repeating themselves which is 611 00:21:57,270 --> 00:21:56,149 and let's go to this page the other of 612 00:21:59,190 --> 00:21:57,280 course uh 613 00:22:00,630 --> 00:21:59,200 although most of the upp described in 614 00:22:02,789 --> 00:22:00,640 our data set probably remain 615 00:22:04,630 --> 00:22:02,799 unidentified due to limited data or 616 00:22:06,870 --> 00:22:04,640 challenges and collecting data 617 00:22:08,070 --> 00:22:06,880 we may require additional scientific 618 00:22:10,549 --> 00:22:08,080 knowledge to select 619 00:22:12,470 --> 00:22:10,559 uh to successfully collect on analyze 620 00:22:14,230 --> 00:22:12,480 and characterize some of them 621 00:22:15,750 --> 00:22:14,240 we would group such objects in this 622 00:22:18,230 --> 00:22:15,760 category pending 623 00:22:20,310 --> 00:22:18,240 uh scientific advances that allowed us 624 00:22:22,789 --> 00:22:20,320 to better understand them 625 00:22:24,230 --> 00:22:22,799 the task force intends to focus 626 00:22:26,630 --> 00:22:24,240 additional analysis 627 00:22:27,590 --> 00:22:26,640 on the small number of cases when a uap 628 00:22:29,590 --> 00:22:27,600 dis uh 629 00:22:31,990 --> 00:22:29,600 appeared to display unusual flight 630 00:22:33,750 --> 00:22:32,000 characteristics or signature management 631 00:22:35,190 --> 00:22:33,760 so uh that uh that's what we're talking 632 00:22:37,669 --> 00:22:35,200 about here the you know the 633 00:22:39,110 --> 00:22:37,679 the high speeds uh the 90 degree turns 634 00:22:41,669 --> 00:22:39,120 at high speeds 635 00:22:43,029 --> 00:22:41,679 yeah the quick acceleration that type of 636 00:22:45,750 --> 00:22:43,039 thing i think those are 637 00:22:47,029 --> 00:22:45,760 those are the et ufos that that we're 638 00:22:49,990 --> 00:22:47,039 really interested in 639 00:22:51,909 --> 00:22:50,000 okay uh uap threatened flight safety and 640 00:22:54,789 --> 00:22:51,919 possibly national security 641 00:22:55,270 --> 00:22:54,799 yeah i certainly don't argue about that 642 00:22:59,510 --> 00:22:55,280 uh 643 00:23:01,830 --> 00:22:59,520 yeah they might 644 00:23:03,029 --> 00:23:01,840 uh it might be a national security risk 645 00:23:05,350 --> 00:23:03,039 but the et's 646 00:23:06,149 --> 00:23:05,360 you know the that's uh they're not they 647 00:23:08,149 --> 00:23:06,159 don't they don't 648 00:23:11,190 --> 00:23:08,159 they're they're not a threat to us uh 649 00:23:14,950 --> 00:23:11,200 ongoing uh airspace concerns uap 650 00:23:17,270 --> 00:23:14,960 uh tf has 11 reports of uh documented 651 00:23:18,630 --> 00:23:17,280 instances in which pilots reported near 652 00:23:22,310 --> 00:23:18,640 misses with uap 653 00:23:23,990 --> 00:23:22,320 uh that the the that i'd like to know 654 00:23:24,870 --> 00:23:24,000 more about those kind of cases so i'm 655 00:23:29,430 --> 00:23:24,880 not sure 656 00:23:32,549 --> 00:23:29,440 ufos i think uh 657 00:23:35,750 --> 00:23:32,559 uh the et ufo's probably uh keep a keep 658 00:23:38,390 --> 00:23:35,760 a good distance uh those aren't uh 659 00:23:40,390 --> 00:23:38,400 cases i don't think but hey i'd like to 660 00:23:42,630 --> 00:23:40,400 know more but uh you know that 661 00:23:44,470 --> 00:23:42,640 uh those details are apparently in the 662 00:23:47,269 --> 00:23:44,480 classified annex and then 663 00:23:49,430 --> 00:23:47,279 potential national security challenges 664 00:23:50,549 --> 00:23:49,440 uh we continue to monitor for evidence 665 00:23:52,230 --> 00:23:50,559 of such programs 666 00:23:55,269 --> 00:23:52,240 given the counter intelligence challenge 667 00:23:58,310 --> 00:23:55,279 they would pose uh particularly uh 668 00:23:59,750 --> 00:23:58,320 uh uap have been detected near military 669 00:24:03,269 --> 00:23:59,760 facilities or by uh 670 00:24:06,870 --> 00:24:03,279 uh or by aircraft carrying usgs 671 00:24:09,750 --> 00:24:06,880 most sensitive sensor systems well okay 672 00:24:11,669 --> 00:24:09,760 so we got that and then explaining uap 673 00:24:14,390 --> 00:24:11,679 will require analytic 674 00:24:15,830 --> 00:24:14,400 collection and resource investment so 675 00:24:17,430 --> 00:24:15,840 here's the part where they ask for the 676 00:24:19,830 --> 00:24:17,440 money 677 00:24:21,669 --> 00:24:19,840 basically uh in line with the provisions 678 00:24:23,510 --> 00:24:21,679 of the senate report accompanying 679 00:24:25,110 --> 00:24:23,520 uh this and that and the other thing a 680 00:24:28,070 --> 00:24:25,120 broader swath of uh 681 00:24:28,549 --> 00:24:28,080 usg uh personnel and technical systems 682 00:24:32,710 --> 00:24:28,559 uh 683 00:24:35,990 --> 00:24:32,720 the uap 684 00:24:38,470 --> 00:24:36,000 tf's ability to employ that uh and 685 00:24:40,390 --> 00:24:38,480 uh employed data analytics to detect 686 00:24:42,149 --> 00:24:40,400 trends that will also improve 687 00:24:43,590 --> 00:24:42,159 and that's uh that's basically yeah that 688 00:24:45,350 --> 00:24:43,600 we do we need 689 00:24:47,510 --> 00:24:45,360 we need more money that's basically what 690 00:24:48,710 --> 00:24:47,520 they're asking for there let me get the 691 00:24:51,430 --> 00:24:48,720 last page here 692 00:24:53,350 --> 00:24:51,440 uh basically this is more we need more 693 00:24:56,470 --> 00:24:53,360 money we need more resources 694 00:24:57,510 --> 00:24:56,480 uh and uh we're uh we're limited uh hang 695 00:24:59,590 --> 00:24:57,520 on a sec let me 696 00:25:01,669 --> 00:24:59,600 get you to that last page there it is 697 00:25:03,190 --> 00:25:01,679 for you and i've got it in front for me 698 00:25:06,390 --> 00:25:03,200 so i can read a little better 699 00:25:09,830 --> 00:25:06,400 and uh expand uh the collection of uh 700 00:25:12,230 --> 00:25:09,840 data and uh oh uh oh uh uh here's one 701 00:25:13,990 --> 00:25:12,240 interesting thing here that uh they're 702 00:25:16,549 --> 00:25:14,000 also is currently working to acquire 703 00:25:18,149 --> 00:25:16,559 additional reporting including from the 704 00:25:19,669 --> 00:25:18,159 u.s air force 705 00:25:20,950 --> 00:25:19,679 like they didn't get anything out of the 706 00:25:21,750 --> 00:25:20,960 air force basically that's what they're 707 00:25:23,750 --> 00:25:21,760 saying here 708 00:25:24,950 --> 00:25:23,760 and has begun receiving data from the 709 00:25:26,630 --> 00:25:24,960 faa so 710 00:25:28,230 --> 00:25:26,640 you know here's this big six-month 711 00:25:30,230 --> 00:25:28,240 report uh 712 00:25:31,430 --> 00:25:30,240 requisitioned by the senate the senate 713 00:25:32,950 --> 00:25:31,440 intelligence committee 714 00:25:34,789 --> 00:25:32,960 and it looks like the air force didn't 715 00:25:38,630 --> 00:25:34,799 do anything and it looks like 716 00:25:39,029 --> 00:25:38,640 the faa is uh is uh going to cooperate 717 00:25:45,909 --> 00:25:39,039 so 718 00:25:47,430 --> 00:25:45,919 in the future and uh that that is 719 00:25:49,350 --> 00:25:47,440 basically it just uh 720 00:25:50,710 --> 00:25:49,360 a continued investment we need more 721 00:25:52,789 --> 00:25:50,720 money we don't have anything 722 00:25:54,549 --> 00:25:52,799 for you right now really uh we don't 723 00:25:55,990 --> 00:25:54,559 know what it is uh we look at all these 724 00:25:58,070 --> 00:25:56,000 cases we don't know what they are 725 00:25:59,830 --> 00:25:58,080 we spend trillions of dollars on defense 726 00:26:00,630 --> 00:25:59,840 so we have all this advanced sensors 727 00:26:03,909 --> 00:26:00,640 we've got the 728 00:26:07,190 --> 00:26:03,919 the best pilots in the world and uh 729 00:26:08,310 --> 00:26:07,200 you know we we don't have anything for 730 00:26:10,470 --> 00:26:08,320 you basically we don't have anything 731 00:26:11,909 --> 00:26:10,480 concrete we don't have anything solid 732 00:26:14,549 --> 00:26:11,919 that's basically what they're saying 733 00:26:17,590 --> 00:26:14,559 here so that's it that's your 734 00:26:19,990 --> 00:26:17,600 that's your 180 day ufo 735 00:26:21,430 --> 00:26:20,000 task force report that's basically it in 736 00:26:22,549 --> 00:26:21,440 summation you can read the whole thing 737 00:26:24,549 --> 00:26:22,559 yourself and 738 00:26:25,830 --> 00:26:24,559 if you see something that i didn't well 739 00:26:28,710 --> 00:26:25,840 uh you know but 740 00:26:30,230 --> 00:26:28,720 i i i do note that uh there's not a lot 741 00:26:32,549 --> 00:26:30,240 of detail in there it's 742 00:26:33,590 --> 00:26:32,559 not a report it's really more of a a 743 00:26:36,549 --> 00:26:33,600 summary and 744 00:26:36,789 --> 00:26:36,559 i was frankly i was expecting more but 745 00:26:40,470 --> 00:26:36,799 it 746 00:26:44,149 --> 00:26:40,480 going to go back to the senate 747 00:26:46,149 --> 00:26:44,159 and obviously uh there's not much in the 748 00:26:47,110 --> 00:26:46,159 uh the the forward-facing uh report 749 00:26:48,549 --> 00:26:47,120 itself 750 00:26:50,390 --> 00:26:48,559 and we'll see what's in the the 751 00:26:52,789 --> 00:26:50,400 classified annex but 752 00:26:53,909 --> 00:26:52,799 i think we'll just get more details of 753 00:26:56,070 --> 00:26:53,919 uh we 754 00:26:57,510 --> 00:26:56,080 don't know what this stuff is and it 755 00:27:00,230 --> 00:26:57,520 could be a few different things 756 00:27:01,510 --> 00:27:00,240 and uh we need more money uh basically 757 00:27:03,430 --> 00:27:01,520 uh that's what i think we're 758 00:27:04,710 --> 00:27:03,440 we're seeing here and that is 759 00:27:07,029 --> 00:27:04,720 unfortunate it's uh 760 00:27:08,230 --> 00:27:07,039 it's clearly going to be a longer 761 00:27:12,149 --> 00:27:08,240 tougher fight 762 00:27:15,190 --> 00:27:12,159 to get information 763 00:27:15,990 --> 00:27:15,200 about specific cases that might be e.t 764 00:27:18,230 --> 00:27:16,000 ufos 765 00:27:20,070 --> 00:27:18,240 that's uh that's what i'm seeing here 766 00:27:21,990 --> 00:27:20,080 but uh the good news is uh 767 00:27:23,510 --> 00:27:22,000 that uh people seem to be in uh the 768 00:27:25,430 --> 00:27:23,520 people seem to be up for the fight 769 00:27:27,190 --> 00:27:25,440 and uh this this doesn't seem like it's 770 00:27:30,230 --> 00:27:27,200 gonna go away anytime soon 771 00:27:30,950 --> 00:27:30,240 so uh that's good and uh later on in the 772 00:27:33,510 --> 00:27:30,960 day 773 00:27:34,230 --> 00:27:33,520 the uh under secretary of defense who 774 00:27:37,350 --> 00:27:34,240 oversees 775 00:27:39,990 --> 00:27:37,360 the uap task force and 776 00:27:40,789 --> 00:27:40,000 also just by way of coincidence also 777 00:27:43,510 --> 00:27:40,799 sees the 778 00:27:45,269 --> 00:27:43,520 special access project or a special 779 00:27:48,870 --> 00:27:45,279 access program committee 780 00:27:51,510 --> 00:27:48,880 uh kathleen hicks issued a declaration 781 00:27:56,389 --> 00:27:53,750 and finally uh late in the afternoon 782 00:27:57,669 --> 00:27:56,399 after the task force report was released 783 00:28:00,389 --> 00:27:57,679 such as it was 784 00:28:01,190 --> 00:28:00,399 uh kathleen hicks the under secretary of 785 00:28:05,029 --> 00:28:01,200 defense 786 00:28:07,190 --> 00:28:05,039 released this memorandum and uh 787 00:28:08,470 --> 00:28:07,200 going back uh it's good to see her 788 00:28:10,710 --> 00:28:08,480 getting involved because 789 00:28:12,470 --> 00:28:10,720 we actually talked about her background 790 00:28:15,990 --> 00:28:12,480 that of avril haynes and 791 00:28:19,510 --> 00:28:16,000 uh lloyd austin the secretary of defense 792 00:28:20,389 --> 00:28:19,520 avril haynes the uh director of national 793 00:28:22,710 --> 00:28:20,399 intelligence but 794 00:28:23,669 --> 00:28:22,720 we talked a little bit about kathleen 795 00:28:25,350 --> 00:28:23,679 hicks's background 796 00:28:29,110 --> 00:28:25,360 and it is a little bit interesting uh 797 00:28:31,430 --> 00:28:29,120 she does have a physics degree so 798 00:28:32,389 --> 00:28:31,440 she should be uh pretty familiar with 799 00:28:36,789 --> 00:28:32,399 the uh 800 00:28:39,269 --> 00:28:36,799 sensing data 801 00:28:41,350 --> 00:28:39,279 and also has an interest in aviation 802 00:28:42,870 --> 00:28:41,360 yeah she did take some pilot lessons at 803 00:28:44,549 --> 00:28:42,880 one point in her life so 804 00:28:46,389 --> 00:28:44,559 she has an interesting background now 805 00:28:48,870 --> 00:28:46,399 she might she might 806 00:28:49,510 --> 00:28:48,880 prove to be going forward a good ally 807 00:28:53,990 --> 00:28:49,520 for us 808 00:28:56,789 --> 00:28:54,000 looking at this ufo stuff but basically 809 00:28:57,990 --> 00:28:56,799 she issued this memorandum that she's 810 00:28:59,909 --> 00:28:58,000 directing the office 811 00:29:01,510 --> 00:28:59,919 of the under secretary of defense for 812 00:29:04,149 --> 00:29:01,520 intelligence and security 813 00:29:06,230 --> 00:29:04,159 to develop a plan to formalize the 814 00:29:07,269 --> 00:29:06,240 mission currently performed by the task 815 00:29:09,190 --> 00:29:07,279 force 816 00:29:10,549 --> 00:29:09,200 establish a set of procedures to 817 00:29:13,669 --> 00:29:10,559 synchronize collection 818 00:29:14,549 --> 00:29:13,679 reporting an analysis of uh data on the 819 00:29:16,389 --> 00:29:14,559 you know 820 00:29:17,830 --> 00:29:16,399 the problem set the data whatever they 821 00:29:19,990 --> 00:29:17,840 want to call it to establish 822 00:29:22,470 --> 00:29:20,000 recommendations for securing 823 00:29:24,070 --> 00:29:22,480 military tests and training ranges 824 00:29:25,669 --> 00:29:24,080 identify requirements for the 825 00:29:26,470 --> 00:29:25,679 establishment operation of the new 826 00:29:28,389 --> 00:29:26,480 activity 827 00:29:30,070 --> 00:29:28,399 to include organizational alignment 828 00:29:32,470 --> 00:29:30,080 resources staffing 829 00:29:34,310 --> 00:29:32,480 required so on and so forth develop in 830 00:29:35,029 --> 00:29:34,320 coordination with the principal staff 831 00:29:36,630 --> 00:29:35,039 assistants 832 00:29:38,950 --> 00:29:36,640 the chairman of the joint chiefs the 833 00:29:41,110 --> 00:29:38,960 secretaries of the military departments 834 00:29:42,630 --> 00:29:41,120 and the commander of the commanders of 835 00:29:46,149 --> 00:29:42,640 the combatant commands 836 00:29:48,389 --> 00:29:46,159 and with the dni and other uh relevant 837 00:29:50,789 --> 00:29:48,399 interagency partners all members of the 838 00:29:54,310 --> 00:29:50,799 department will utilize these processes 839 00:29:57,190 --> 00:29:54,320 to ensure that the task force or uh 840 00:29:59,510 --> 00:29:57,200 it's uh follow-on activity uh has 841 00:30:02,230 --> 00:29:59,520 reports of uap observations within 842 00:30:02,549 --> 00:30:02,240 two weeks of an occurrence so uh that is 843 00:30:10,470 --> 00:30:02,559 a 844 00:30:12,950 --> 00:30:10,480 hicks 845 00:30:13,590 --> 00:30:12,960 so we will see we are in a long tough 846 00:30:16,710 --> 00:30:13,600 fight 847 00:30:18,630 --> 00:30:16,720 uh we found that the air force is uh 848 00:30:20,149 --> 00:30:18,640 not being especially cooperative we'll 849 00:30:21,669 --> 00:30:20,159 see where that leads 850 00:30:25,590 --> 00:30:21,679 we know that the air force has been 851 00:30:30,870 --> 00:30:28,789 that the air force stonewalled the a-tip 852 00:30:34,230 --> 00:30:30,880 program where the investigators 853 00:30:37,110 --> 00:30:34,240 from that program looked to 854 00:30:37,510 --> 00:30:37,120 interview pilots who had chased a ufo 855 00:30:39,590 --> 00:30:37,520 over 856 00:30:41,110 --> 00:30:39,600 texas during the stephenville case uh 857 00:30:43,029 --> 00:30:41,120 back in 2008 858 00:30:45,029 --> 00:30:43,039 and uh they had signed non-disclosure 859 00:30:48,070 --> 00:30:45,039 agreements and weren't allowed to talk 860 00:30:51,110 --> 00:30:48,080 and i don't think that that 861 00:30:52,310 --> 00:30:51,120 stephenville case uh one of the cases 862 00:30:55,350 --> 00:30:52,320 that are involved 863 00:30:58,630 --> 00:30:55,360 in the uh the classified annex of the uh 864 00:31:01,269 --> 00:30:58,640 task force report uh my guess is uh uh 865 00:31:01,669 --> 00:31:01,279 that's not in there at all and also uh 866 00:31:03,990 --> 00:31:01,679 we 867 00:31:06,070 --> 00:31:04,000 got a first person account from pj 868 00:31:08,710 --> 00:31:06,080 hughes who was on the nimitz uh 869 00:31:10,549 --> 00:31:08,720 we got that right here uh during one of 870 00:31:11,029 --> 00:31:10,559 our shows about the nimitz case he was 871 00:31:13,669 --> 00:31:11,039 on 872 00:31:14,310 --> 00:31:13,679 and talked about how an air force 873 00:31:17,669 --> 00:31:14,320 officer 874 00:31:20,149 --> 00:31:17,679 was on the nimitz collecting the sensing 875 00:31:22,630 --> 00:31:20,159 data from the e2 hawkeye 876 00:31:23,269 --> 00:31:22,640 uh spy plane that their radar plane i 877 00:31:26,549 --> 00:31:23,279 should say 878 00:31:27,430 --> 00:31:26,559 uh that had captured the uh data of the 879 00:31:30,310 --> 00:31:27,440 uh the tic tac 880 00:31:30,630 --> 00:31:30,320 ufo uh during that that famous incident 881 00:31:32,549 --> 00:31:30,640 so 882 00:31:35,110 --> 00:31:32,559 uh this uh this uh kathleen hicks she 883 00:31:36,870 --> 00:31:35,120 could be our best ally in all this yeah 884 00:31:39,350 --> 00:31:36,880 you never know it uh could be 885 00:31:40,789 --> 00:31:39,360 could be interesting uh uh largely again 886 00:31:42,950 --> 00:31:40,799 the the uh the report 887 00:31:45,029 --> 00:31:42,960 uh i i've gotta call it yeah it's not a 888 00:31:47,190 --> 00:31:45,039 report really yeah what it is is 889 00:31:48,470 --> 00:31:47,200 uh what i thought it wouldn't be it was 890 00:31:51,269 --> 00:31:48,480 an abstract 891 00:31:53,110 --> 00:31:51,279 tour report basically a public abstract 892 00:31:54,950 --> 00:31:53,120 to a classified report 893 00:31:57,909 --> 00:31:54,960 that's where the the meat is uh 894 00:32:00,070 --> 00:31:57,919 hopefully as marco rubio suggests 895 00:32:01,750 --> 00:32:00,080 that the full report does leak so we 896 00:32:02,149 --> 00:32:01,760 have a better idea of what we're talking 897 00:32:04,789 --> 00:32:02,159 about 898 00:32:05,590 --> 00:32:04,799 but that's what we've got for now uh i'm 899 00:32:08,070 --> 00:32:05,600 not sure 900 00:32:09,029 --> 00:32:08,080 when what the i guess i will be picking 901 00:32:10,950 --> 00:32:09,039 up reactions 902 00:32:12,710 --> 00:32:10,960 throughout the coming week uh to the 903 00:32:14,710 --> 00:32:12,720 report it will be interesting but we did 904 00:32:16,789 --> 00:32:14,720 see one reaction it's a key one it's 905 00:32:18,310 --> 00:32:16,799 one that we really like and it's good to 906 00:32:20,230 --> 00:32:18,320 end on a high note but 907 00:32:21,830 --> 00:32:20,240 again what we're seeing is well going 908 00:32:22,950 --> 00:32:21,840 forward we're going to be tracking this 909 00:32:25,590 --> 00:32:22,960 stuff very carefully 910 00:32:27,990 --> 00:32:25,600 uh when we know that a lot of this stuff 911 00:32:29,590 --> 00:32:28,000 is uh has been tracked all along so uh 912 00:32:30,549 --> 00:32:29,600 what are you gonna do it's a part of the 913 00:32:32,470 --> 00:32:30,559 fight for the truth 914 00:32:34,230 --> 00:32:32,480 it's not gonna be an easy one uh we're 915 00:32:35,990 --> 00:32:34,240 not done yet and we're certainly not 916 00:32:38,070 --> 00:32:36,000 done here although i am hoping i'm gonna 917 00:32:40,310 --> 00:32:38,080 be able to take next holiday weekend off 918 00:32:42,389 --> 00:32:40,320 but you never know there might be enough 919 00:32:44,070 --> 00:32:42,399 for me to talk about and if i do i'm 920 00:32:46,630 --> 00:32:44,080 probably gonna try to get it done 921 00:32:47,590 --> 00:32:46,640 uh uh early and uh not wait until sunday 922 00:32:50,310 --> 00:32:47,600 so i can 923 00:32:52,149 --> 00:32:50,320 get my full uh three-day holiday weekend 924 00:32:54,310 --> 00:32:52,159 uh celebrated properly and 925 00:32:55,350 --> 00:32:54,320 not have to uh worry about doing this 926 00:32:57,430 --> 00:32:55,360 but 927 00:32:58,470 --> 00:32:57,440 i hope you enjoyed the show everybody i 928 00:33:00,789 --> 00:32:58,480 went through everything 929 00:33:01,750 --> 00:33:00,799 by all means uh read that task force 930 00:33:04,389 --> 00:33:01,760 report 931 00:33:05,269 --> 00:33:04,399 uh for yourself it's readily available 932 00:33:07,029 --> 00:33:05,279 and uh 933 00:33:09,190 --> 00:33:07,039 go through it uh maybe you see some 934 00:33:11,750 --> 00:33:09,200 things in it that i didn't see maybe i'm 935 00:33:12,470 --> 00:33:11,760 misinterpreting a few things uh i don't 936 00:33:15,750 --> 00:33:12,480 know but 937 00:33:17,350 --> 00:33:15,760 that's what i see uh and again 938 00:33:19,509 --> 00:33:17,360 it's been an interesting day to say the 939 00:33:20,870 --> 00:33:19,519 least but uh obviously i was expecting a 940 00:33:22,310 --> 00:33:20,880 lot more from the report 941 00:33:24,710 --> 00:33:22,320 but uh maybe we got a little bit of a 942 00:33:27,509 --> 00:33:24,720 consolation prize at the end of the day 943 00:33:28,710 --> 00:33:27,519 with uh uh the under secretary of 944 00:33:31,110 --> 00:33:28,720 defense's hicks's 945 00:33:32,950 --> 00:33:31,120 memorandum uh related to the report 946 00:33:35,190 --> 00:33:32,960 although again hey she's been in office 947 00:33:37,029 --> 00:33:35,200 almost half a year now they've known 948 00:33:38,549 --> 00:33:37,039 all this was coming it's like why do you 949 00:33:40,070 --> 00:33:38,559 wait till the why do you wait till the 950 00:33:40,950 --> 00:33:40,080 last minute i mean what do these people 951 00:33:43,029 --> 00:33:40,960 think they are me 952 00:33:44,149 --> 00:33:43,039 you know they should be on top of these 953 00:33:46,630 --> 00:33:44,159 things after all 954 00:33:48,470 --> 00:33:46,640 you know it's our uh uh it's our our 955 00:33:48,950 --> 00:33:48,480 national defense you know it's a stake 956 00:33:51,110 --> 00:33:48,960 here 957 00:33:51,990 --> 00:33:51,120 but uh we're getting a little bit closer 958 00:33:54,789 --> 00:33:52,000 we learned a little bit 959 00:33:55,269 --> 00:33:54,799 more today and we learned that the air 960 00:33:58,470 --> 00:33:55,279 force 961 00:34:01,029 --> 00:33:58,480 wants more money 962 00:34:03,590 --> 00:34:01,039 and they they don't have enough data and 963 00:34:06,230 --> 00:34:03,600 to be honest about it i'm not sure 964 00:34:07,590 --> 00:34:06,240 how much data there really is that over 965 00:34:10,230 --> 00:34:07,600 time it builds up 966 00:34:11,349 --> 00:34:10,240 but uh you know from day to day week to 967 00:34:13,829 --> 00:34:11,359 week month to month 968 00:34:15,190 --> 00:34:13,839 probably not that much data on the the 969 00:34:17,589 --> 00:34:15,200 et ufos 970 00:34:18,470 --> 00:34:17,599 but over a period of time it builds up 971 00:34:21,669 --> 00:34:18,480 and of course uh 972 00:34:23,750 --> 00:34:21,679 again no mention that uh these types of 973 00:34:26,149 --> 00:34:23,760 these types of cases they don't go back 974 00:34:27,669 --> 00:34:26,159 to 2004 the ufo phenomena didn't start 975 00:34:31,270 --> 00:34:27,679 in 2004 976 00:34:33,030 --> 00:34:31,280 as far as uh you know as as far as 977 00:34:34,629 --> 00:34:33,040 the historical record goes at least in 978 00:34:36,629 --> 00:34:34,639 terms of aviation 979 00:34:38,470 --> 00:34:36,639 and goes back at least to world war ii 980 00:34:41,589 --> 00:34:38,480 and then obviously picked up 981 00:34:43,669 --> 00:34:41,599 uh back in 1947 and 982 00:34:45,349 --> 00:34:43,679 uh we've got those kind of cases with 983 00:34:47,909 --> 00:34:45,359 radar with pilot 984 00:34:48,950 --> 00:34:47,919 uh sightings and so on and so forth uh 985 00:34:51,829 --> 00:34:48,960 going back uh 986 00:34:52,869 --> 00:34:51,839 that far so uh those cases aren't even 987 00:34:56,470 --> 00:34:52,879 mentioned and uh 988 00:34:58,230 --> 00:34:56,480 i wonder uh wonder if uh uh 989 00:34:59,589 --> 00:34:58,240 well you wonder what they're thinking 990 00:35:00,870 --> 00:34:59,599 about this uh so 991 00:35:03,349 --> 00:35:00,880 uh all right well you have a good 992 00:35:05,030 --> 00:35:03,359 weekend and i'm i'm about out of time 993 00:35:07,190 --> 00:35:05,040 here so uh have a good weekend 994 00:35:08,550 --> 00:35:07,200 and we'll talk to you again well as soon